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(Resumen) 
Este artículo discute el destino interrelacionado de dos instituciones 
estadounidenses que se originaron en la época revolucionaria y que son extensiones de 
la idea de la soberanía del pueblo. Una es la presidencia, algo que no tiene 
equivalente fuera de los Estados Unidos, y la otra es la prensa independiente, cosa que 
ha sido muy escasa fuera del mundo occidental. La libertad de la prensa está 
garantizada en la Constitución de los Estados Unidos y, como resultado, muchos 
periodistas han aprovechado del derecho para criticar duramente a la política, y en 
particular al presidente. Este artículo recorre la evolución de la relación entre estas 
dos instituciones, utilizando distintos ejemplos de conflicto y malentendidos, desde la 
época de Benjamín Franklin hasta los presidentes más destacados del siglo XX. 
Aunque la controversia de los últimos años entre la prensa estadounidense y los 
presidentes ha provocado mayor auto-conciencia e introspección entre los periodistas, 
desafortunadamente estos problemas no están más cerca a una resolución que cuando 
sugieron por primera vez hace varias décadas. 
Once upon a time the notion of "sovereignty of the people" was an audacious 
and original way of making a new govemment distinctive and legitímate. 1 or what was 
startling and special about the American political experiment, beginning a liltle over 
two centuries ago, was the extent to which government was to be dependent upon 
popular will, upon public opinión. The leaders of "the first new nation" claimed that 
theír power, which was limited and temporary, was to be based upon the franchise, 
which could be effectuated only if the citizenry were informed and wise. The birth 
certifícate of an independent nation therefore asserts not only that Ufe, líberty and the 
pursuit of happiness are inalienable, but also that rebellion must be justifíed out of "a 
decent respect to the opinions of mankind." And one illustration of the importance 
of the consent of the govemed is the ¡ntertwined fate of two institutions that also 
oríginated in the Revolutionary period and that are extensions of the idea of the 
sovereignty of the people. One is the Presidency, which then had no exact equivalent 
outside the United States; the other is the independent press, which has been rare 
enough outside the Western world. 
To recount American political experience, without also mdicating how public 
opinión has been molded and registered, is to skip an essential dimensión of that 
history. Such an account would have to begin wíth Benjamín Franklin, who, for all his 
versatflity and virtuosity, identifíed hímself ín his will merely as a prínter. His was also 
the first truly American book, the Autobiography, whose central distínction between 
appearance and reality (in one of the most interesting passages ín the book) is perhaps 
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"the" philosophical problem of the joumalistic enterprise. The Revolution itself might 
have been different without such pyrogenic propagandists as Samuel Adanis and 
Thomas Paine. The Alien and Sedition Acts, an early attempt to gag the press, so 
discredited the adtninistration of John Adams that a peaceíul transfer of power was 
accomplished in 1800 to the party of Jefferson, who called that election itself a 
revolution. Visiting Jacksonian America, Alexis de Tocqueville made the forcé of 
public opinión (and the rambunctious energy of the press) the centerpiece of his 
critique of egalitarian democracy. Enough Northerners valued freedom of expression 
to make martyrs out of Abolitionists like Elijah Lovejoy, whose life was taken and 
whose printing press was destroyed by an Illinois mob in 1837. The eloquencc of 
Willianí I.loyd Garrison and Irederick Douglass, who wcrc not only orators but also 
editors, hclped convince many in the North that the price ot slavcry was too high for 
the land of the free to pay. When President l.incoln demurred, however, and 
announced that the salvation of the Union and not the emancipation of the slaves was 
the paramount issue in the war, his most-quoted articulation of Northern war aims was 
not addressed to the Congress but to an editor, the cantankerous Horace Greeley of 
the New York Tribune. 
Fewer Americans foUowed Greeley's advice, which was to move from east to 
west, than followed his example, which was to move from country to city (Potter 94), 
where by the final decade of the nineteenth century they were reading "yellow 
joumalism." The story of American expansión overseas, beginning with the Spanish-
American War, cannot ignore the sensationalist circulation wars between Joseph 
Pulitzer's New York World and William Randolph Hearst's New York Journal. Not too 
much credence, however, should be placed on the telegram that Hearst sent to an 
illustrator in Cuba who found only placid scenes and no likelihood of American 
intervention: "You fumish the pictures and Til fumish the war." It ís of course one of 
the great lines in the saga of American individualism, too sharp a line not to be 
recycled inte the most widely admired American films of the sound era, Citizen Kane 
(1941), the biography of a newspaper publisher. The original script had a simple—and 
significant—working tille:/Iwcncfln (Swanbergl27; Carringer 18). 
Ñor could the nation's literary history be told without including former 
newspapermen líke Walt Whitman, Mark Twain, Stephen Crane, Theodore Dreiser, 
Emest Hemingway and John Dos Passos. Perhaps such a joumalistic apprenticeship, 
according to one acholar, "exposed each writer to a vast range of experience that would 
ultin;ately form the core of his greatest imaginative works. It forced him to become 
a precise observer" and perhaps "taught him to be suSpicious of secondhand accounts 
and to insist on seeing with his own eyes." Sinclair Lewis's most political novel, // 
Can'tHappen Here (1935), pits an old-fashioned country editor (straight out of Norman 
Rockwell) against a fascist politician (straight out of George Lincoln Rockwell). It may 
not be accidental that the chosen persona for the comic strip hero Superman was Clark 
Kent, who worked, if memory serves, as a repórter for the ÜQÜy Planet. Norman 
Mailer, who has wanted to be known as a novelist, was nevertheless the founder and 
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part-owner oí a newspaper, the Village Voice. Even Henry Ford, the greatest folk hero 
of rural Americans ¡n the first half of the twentieth century, felt obliged to own a 
newspaper, the Dearborn Independent. Except for writers of fiction, no one exerted 
greater influence upon the attitudes of 1920s youth than Henry L. Mencken, a regular 
contríbutor to the Baltimore Sun. Perhaps the over-thirty citizen whom radical youth 
in the 1960s most admired was I. F. Stone, whose resemblance to Thomas Paine had 
not gone unnoticed. A couple of scholars have advanced the interesting argument that 
the work of the most influential and important American political philosopher of the 
twentieth century could not be found in the learncd journals but instead on the 
editorial page of the New York World and in the syndicated columns of the New York 
Herald-Tribune, Walter Lippmann (Fishkin 4; Rossiter and Lee xi-xx). 
Perhaps in no other country has journalism been so prestigious for long than 
in the United States, though the disparaging remarks of, say, S^ren Kierkegaard are 
far too extreme to constitute a fair comparison with European attitudes. "Phe lowest 
depth to which people can sink before God is defined by the word journalist,'" the 
theologian once wrote. "If I were a father and had a daughter who was seduced, I 
should not despair over her; I would hope for her salvation. But if I had a son who 
became a journalist and conlinued to be one for five years, I would give him up" 
(Kierkegaard 431). 
In recent years the press, especially in its treatment of Presidents, has become 
increasingly the subject of controversy, its means and ends increasingly the subject of 
political debate itself. New, if unintentional, pertinence can be detected in Julius 
Caesar's lines (in Act I, Scene ii of Shakespeare's play): "Who is it in the press who 
calis on me? I hear a tongue shriller than all the music." Journalism is controversial 
because it is so influential: the three televisión evening news shows of CBS, NBC and 
ABC have regularly drawn about fifty million viewers, and one newspaper in particular 
was responsible for helping to discredit nearly all the President's men and to trigger 
the unprecedented resignation of the Commander in Chief. One measure of the 
enhanced prestige of journalism is the vocational interest among American 
undergraduates; many students would have liked to have been Bob Woodward and 
Cari Bemstein—although only Robert Redford and Dustin Hoffman were allowed to 
play Woodward and Bemstein in the 1976 film. Given the Ongoing fascination with the 
relationship between the press and the Presidency, there is exigency in an historical 
inquiry, however brief, into the implications for a powerful executive branch of the 
First Amendment's prohibition upon any Congressional "law abridging freedom. . . of 
the press." 
For purposes of clarification, a dichotomy of extreme Presidential responses 
to press criticism can be proposed. At one pole is Thomas Jefferson, the President 
most associated with a high-minded and ringing defense of 
freedom of the press, subject only to liability for personal injuries. This 
formidable censor of the public functionaries, by arraigning them at the 
tribunal of public opinión, produces reform peaceably, which must otherwise 
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be done by revolution. It is also the best iiistrunient lor cnlightcning the niind 
of man, and improving him as a rational, moral and social bcing (I.cvy, 
Freedom 333). 
Jefferson went even further while the Constitution was being devised. Writing froni 
Paris on "the basis of our governments being the opinión of the people" (Ix'vy, 
Freedom 373), he formuiated an unnecessarily stark hypothesis: "Were it lett to me to 
decide whether we should have a govemment without newspapers or newspapers 
without a govemment, I should not hesitate for a moment to prefer the latter" (Levy, 
Freedom 373). And yet the almost touching absolutism of Jefferson's faith could not 
be sustained. Five years after he left the White House to return to Monticello, he 
privately attacked 
the putrid state into which our newspapers have passed, and the malignity, the 
vulgarity, and mendacious spirit of those who write for them. . . . As vehicles 
of information, and a curb on our functionaries, they have rendered 
themselves useless, by forfeiting all title to belief (Levy, Freedom 376). 
Thus the familiar charge that joumalists lie has a perhaps surprising ancestry. In his 
final years the Founding Father who first achieved prominence because of the facility 
of his pen read only one newspaper, the Richmond Enquirer, and "that chiefly [for] the 
advertisements, for they contain the only truths to be relied on in a newspaper" (Levy, 
Jefferson 68). Jefferson may well have exaggerated the abuses of the early republican 
press which, however partisan and acerbic, was not consistently unfaír; but he 
contmued to enuncíate the ideal of liberty of expression. 
That the ideal differed from the real can be suggested by an incident over 
a century later, when the American Civil Liberties Union lodged a protest with James 
Michael Curley, the legendary Irish-American mayor who had banned a Ku Klux Klan 
rally in Boston. The ACLU representative wrote Curley eloquently about the First 
Amendment rights that all citizens of the nation were guaranteed and quoted 
frequently from Jefferson's inspired writings on human liberty. But Curley remained 
unmoved, and his reply was brief: "My dear sir, I know perfectly well what these great 
statesmen said, but I also know what they did" (Murphy 58-59). 
In this instance, the mayor's historical sense was accurate. Jefferson, for 
example, sought to muffie the Federalist oppositíon press of his day by taking 
advantage of a loophole in the First Amendment which prohibited only the Congress 
from abridging freedom of the press: state prosecutions might therefore be undertaken 
in cases of seditious libe!. He thus found it a little too easy to identify attacks upon 
the policies and personnel of his Democratic-Republican administration with threats 
to the civil order itself, and his reaction was as sly as it was thin-skinned. Here, for 
example, is an excerpt from a confidential letter that the President wrote in 1803—it 
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is not being leaked for the first tinie—to his ally, Governor Thomas McKean of 
Pennsylvania: 
The press ought to be restored to its credibility if possible. The restraiiits 
provided by the laws ol the states are sufficient for this if applied. And I have 
therefore long thought that a few prosecutions of the inost prominent 
offenders would have a wholesome effect in restoring the integrity of the 
presses. Not a general prosecution, for that would look like persecution; but 
a selected one (Levy, Jefferson 58-59). 
With that letter Jefferson enclosed a newspaper that he himself considered a promising 
target for selected prosecution. It is intriguing that, in refusing to reléase the White 
House tapes under the doctrine of executive privilege in 1974, Richard Nixon had 
draped himself in the toga of the sage of Monticello, whose establishment of precedent 
when subpoenaed was in fact ambiguous. But it is not widely known how much of a 
Jeffersonian, in the sense of hostility to the press, President Nixon actually was. 
The threat of prosecutions to the independence of the press should be seen 
as only one kind of Presidential policy, however. Its polar opposite is perhaps best 
represented, among early executives, by Andrew Jackson. It is true that one can cite 
from Jackson's letters all sorts of nasty remarks about the contemporary press. A 
successful duelist, he had a tendency to become "Action" Jackson, to take personal 
offense in an age when editing was a high-risk occupation, especially in the South, 
where packing a pistol was more useful for joumalists than owning a thesaurus. But 
the characteristic Jacksonian response was not vüifjcation and persecution but a more 
oblique danger to an autonomous press: what during John F. Kennedy's administration 
was labelled "managed news." The press, which was supposed to be independent if the 
public was to be fairly and fuUy informed, was partly incorporated into the 
administration as a mouthpiece of its policies. Three of the five advisors in Jackson's 
"kitchen cabinet" were vetaran joumalists, of whom the most important were Amos 
Kendall and Francis P. Blair. Newspapers like the United States Telegraph and the 
Washington Globe, v/hich Blair edited, were essentially conduits of the President's 
views. The Globe got govemment advertising as well as the printing responsibilities for 
govemment departments, and Federal office-holders whose salaries were more than 
$1000 per year were expected to subscribe to it. No wonder the semi-weekly m 1830 
burgeoned quickly into a daily. The Globe's definition of objectivity was predictably 
fuzzy: the speeches of the Whig opposition leaders were generally unexcerpted and 
unreported in its. news columns, while the editorials of rather obscure country 
newspapers were copiously quoted "as an indication of public opinión." In fact those 
editorials were written by Kendall and Blair within the executive branch and then 
planted in the provincial press for the purpose of getting reprinted in the Washington 
Globe to suggest grass-roots opinión (Schlesinger Jr., Age 67-73; PoUard 153-71; 
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Weisberger 78-82).' Like Jacob and Esau before the patriarch Isaac, the hand was the 
hand of some rustic printe,; but the voice was the voice of Oíd Hickory himself. For 
some the distinction between joumalism and what became known in the twentieth 
century as public relations was thus blurred. 
Within this necessarily schematic framework of repression at one extreme and 
co-option on the other, the tensión between modern Presidents and the press niight 
be seen in sharper outline. Most of the important twentieth century chief executives 
have veered closer to the Jacksonian than to the Jeffersonian model: reporters have 
more often been used than abused, outmaneuvered than opposed actively. Cióse to 
a happy médium, to a healthy distance from the press, was the first modern President. 
Theodore Roosevelt established the first anteroom for White House correspondents, 
and from time to time he allowed himself, while shaving, to be interrogated by the first 
celebrated investigative journalist, Lincoln Steffens. There may have been a hint of 
intimidation in Roosevelt's denunciation of "muckrakers," the term he coined in an 
attempt to impugn or at least limit the joumalistic ventilation of smoke-filled rooms 
and the exposure of corporate corruption. But Roosevelt also adhered to what 
Alexander Hamilton had deemed essential to govemment: "energy in the executive" 
(The Federalist no. 70). By being so newsworthy, by making "good copy," he attracted 
favorable notices and inaugurated the centralization of power in the executive branch 
that is the primary fact of modern American politics. Like the wonderful actor Barry 
Fitzgerald, "he could steal a scene from a dog." Theodore Roosevelt knew that the 
blare of headlines dwarfed the impact of editorials, and grasped the rhythm of the 
news cycle so that his political activities and personal vitality would domínate the front 
page rather than get buried next to the shipping news. The President leaked, bluffed, 
blustered, and was so inventive and shrewd that he succeeded in "making. . . modern 
joumalism work for him" (Juergens 5-12,14-40,72-79, 267, 268; Boorstin/4merica 102; 
Comwell, Jr. 7). 
But perhaps the most adroit of Presidents in dealing with the press was 
Roosevelt's distant cousin, who had taken undergraduate pride in editing the Harvard 
Crimson and became a master not only of the art of being "good copy" but of the new 
médium of radio. One measure of the astonishing directness with which Franklin 
Roosevelt used the radio is how readily his "fireside chats" could be conjured up by 
those with memories (or those too young to remember) and yet those chats were 
delivered only about twice a year. Intimacy and personal warmth were so distinctively 
his political signature that Roosevelt could say "my oíd friend" in eleven languages. 
But his use of the radio was more than temperamentally suitable, it was also a partisan 
necessity: by 1935, 60% of the nation's press was editorially against the New Deal. 
In the campaign the following year, among the 150 leading newspapers, those 
supporting Alfred M. Landon enjoyed a circulation of fourteen million, those favoring 
1. This technique was later imitated, with politically harmless implications, by the 
Reader's Digest (Boorstin, Daniel. The Image. New York: Atheneum, 1962, 135-136). 
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Roosevelt had a circulation of under seven million. Among the large dailies, three-
fourths were for the Republican challenger and only about a fifth were for the 
incumbent. One of the biggest dailies, the Chicago Tribune, once headlined in 1936 
that a "Roosevelt Área in Wisconsin is a Hotbed of Vice" and began a news account 
of the Republican campaign as foUows: "Governor Alf M. Landon brought his great 
crusade for the preservation of the American foundation of government iiito l.os 
Angeles" (Boorstin,/lme/Tca 107-12; PoUard 773-840; Leuchtenburg 330-31; Schlesiiíger 
Jr., Politics 7). Such bias could of course cut both ways, however. Durijig the 1940 
campaign, for example, an announcer on a Yiddish radio program in Detroit was heard 
to deliver a fervent message on behalf of Wendell Willkie, to conclude that "this has 
been a paid political announcement" and then to add his own obiter dictum: "As for 
me, I'm voting for Roosevelt."^ 
Against such pervasive opposition to the New Deal among American 
publishers, Roosevelt had little choice but to outflank what he called "the Tory press." 
He injected new Ufe into the regular press conference that Woodrow Wilson had 
originated, but abandoned when it worked to his disadvantage (Juergens 149-51), a 
forum that has been followed by most subsequent Presidents. (Exceptions have 
included Herbert Hoover, Lyndon Johnson, and Richard Nixon.) In the press 
conference Franklin D. Roosevelt could display his own domination of the mechanics 
of government, could present and elabórate upon his budgets and other policies, could 
plant rumors and float trial balloons that his cousin Teddy had invented, and—perhaps 
most importantly—get a feel for citizens' concems by the kinds of questions that 
reporters asked him. In this indirect but invaluable fashion, he faced the nation 337 
times in his first term, 374 in his second. During his twelve years and one nionth in 
office, Roosevelt held an average of nearly two press conferences a week—Nixon by 
contrast would average seven a year. Comers were cut, however. Access to Roosevelt 
also exacted a price upon photographers, who played by the implicit rule never to show 
the President as an invalid who was incapable of walking (Schlesinger Jr., Imperial 224; 
White, Making 265; Grossman and Kumar 27-28). As a result few citizens seemed to 
realize that the President was paralyzed from the hips down. He was privately 
vituf)erative against some reporters, some columnists, and some publishers—like Moses 
Annenberg, the anti-New Deal owner of the Inquirer and the Racing Form. After 
Roosevelt growled to his Secretary of the Treasury, "I want Moe Annenberg for 
dinner," the obedient cabinet officer offered a reassuring reply: "You're going to have 
him for breakfast—fried," which is pretty much what happened. Convicted of income 
tax evasión, the publisher was jailed from 1940 until 1942, when he died of a heart 
attack (Morgan 555-56; Cooney 20, 125-28). 
Yet Roosevelt's public reaction to press criticism was characteristically stylish 
rather than surly or self-pitying. At a Gridiron Club banquet late in 1934, he quoted 
2. Author's conversation with Lawrence H. Fuchs, Westton, Massachusets, 1974. 
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at length from the vehemently anti-New Deal H. L. Mencken's brilliant and dyspeptic 
dissection of his profession: "Joumalism in America," which a decade earlier liad 
blamed "most of the evüs that continué to beset American joumalism today" not upon 
"the rascality of the owners" or the narrowness of business managers, but upon "the 
stupidity, cowardice and Philistinism of working newspaper men." In attendance, 
Mencken lost his sense of humor when Roosevelt quoted him, and vowed to "get the 
son of a bitch"—but never in fact managed to lay a glove on him (Bode 308-11; 
Schlesinger Jr,. Corning 565). Until the Second World War changed the circumstances, 
the threat to use the prosecutory powers of the Federal govemment, or indirectly 
through the states, generally lay fallow. And whatever the air of deviousness that still 
hangs over the reputation of Franklin D. Roosevelt, he did not suffer from what was 
later politely called a credibility gap; his accessibility helped him to earn the résped 
of most news reporters who covered him, even as their editors upheld the adversary 
ideal. Thus the extremes of persecution and of news management were avoided, and 
columnist Heywood Broun was right to praise him as "the best newspaperman who has 
ever been President of the United States" (Boorstin, Image 20). 
Kennedy was much in this mold, though less successfully. What Roosevelt was 
to radio, Kennedy was to televisión, from the 1960 debates that helped him edge past 
Nixon that November to the press conferences that undoubtedly enhanced his 
popularity beyond his narrow mándate. While already in prep school, Kennedy was 
unusual in cherishing a subscription to the New York Times, whose editorial 
endorsement in 1960 led him to quip, in the light of the then-ubiquitous subway 
advertisements for that newspaper, that he got his job through the New York Times. 
Had he lived long enough to retire from the Presidency, Kennedy had thought of 
becoming a newspaper publisher, and shared Roosevelt's genuine liking for reporters, 
devouring their stories along with his breakfast (Whiie, President 1960 337; Schlesinger 
Jr., Thousand 716-19,1017; Bradlee 18-19,74-75,149-52; Bumer 16). Indeed Kennedy 
was so accessible to some reporters and editors that the independence of the press was 
somewhat compromised; the adversary ideal was so perforated that Kennedy and the 
joumalists who covered him seemed almost to opérate on the buddy system. 
That, it may be conceded, was the press's problem, not the President's; but it 
was also a national problem, a vulnerability to myth at the expense of realistic 
judgment. During Kennedy's administration, in 1962, John Ford's The Man Who Shot 
Liberty Valance had portrayed a newspaper editor, Dutton Peabody (Edmond O'Brien), 
whose motto became lapidary: "When the legend becomes fact, print the legend." With 
Kennedy's assassination the age of Camelot, an era that can only be termed innocent, 
cante to a cióse, even though, in the United States, reports of the death of innocence 
are"ahvays exaggerated. Two examples may suffice. The first is actually from the 
spríng of 1960, when Eisenhower's second term was almost over and when the Central 
Intelligence Agency's U-2 spy plañe was shot down over Soviet territory. At first the 
administration lied, claiming that Moscow had knocked down a weather plañe engaged 
in a routine mission. Two years earlier the military correspondent of the New York 
Times had penetrated the secret of the top-secret plañe, as had two of its other 
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reporters, but for security reasons the story had not been printed. The May 6, 1960 
edition of the aforementioned newspaper did not report that the United States 
goverament asserted it was a weather plañe. The Times simply stated that it was a 
weather plañe, and seemed to accept the claim of the federal government rather than 
trying to leam whether the Soviet charges were true, as in this instance they were 
(Moynihan 42; Beschloss 234-35, 250, 251, 258). 
Less than a year later, with President Kennedy green-lighting Eisenhower's 
C Í A invasión of the Bay of Pigs, the Times had managed to piece together a story on 
the forthcoming assault on Cuba and had planned to give the story the attention it 
deserved. Repórter Tad Szulc had even leamed of the government's order for radio 
silence on April 18,1961, an order that made invasión "imminent." The Times ran the 
story on page 1 on April 7: "Anti-Castro Units Trained to Fight at Florida Bases," but 
toned down Szulc's original account, because Washington bureau chief James (Scotty) 
Reston and publisher Orville Dryfoos put national security concems and the 
Presidential gamble ahead of the "scoop." In effect the newspaper elevated a definition 
of the national interest—the potential defeat of Fidel Castro—ahead of its own 
Constitutional and professional interest in disclosing facts bearing on public issues. 
The Times did not explicitly mention the complicity of the CÍA. The exposed invasión 
plans did not therefore genérate the sort of opposition that might have flared had the 
Times conspicuously reported what it knew, and the invasión itself was of course a 
fiasco—not by later standards, but still a fiasco. Kennedy later told managing editor 
Tumer Catledge: "If you had printed more about the operation, you would have saved 
US from a colossal mistake" (Catledge 259-65; Schlesinger Jr., A Thousand 260-61; 
Slisbury 148-63; Tálese 4-5). 
The Times was not designed to be an auxiliary of the executive branch, and the 
President became a wiser man, though still not sufficiently respectful of the autonomy 
of the press. In the fall of 1963, he hinted to the publisher of the Times that its Saigon 
correspondent was "too cióse to the story" there and should be transferred—David 
Halberstam's dispatches bore almost no resemblance to the official optimism from 
Vietnam. But he was not removed from his post, and went on not only to eam a 
Pulitzer Prize for his reporting but also to be vindicated, broadly speaking, when the 
political and military failures of American policy in Indochina could no longer be 
camouflaged, especially during the terms of Johnson and Nixon. Referring to the 
1964-68 phase of the conflict, Halberstam recalled: 
The White House constantly, constantly lied about what its intentions were. 
. . . Scotty Reston's phrase "escalating by stealth" is exactly right. . . . They 
were lying to their own Bureau of the Budget Director, they were lying to the 
Council of Economic Advisers, they were lying to everybody.. . . That is why 
they have no credibility (33-34; Grossman and Kumar 10). 
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The patent attempts by such administrations to hide the failures of toreign and 
domestic policy have put innocence very much on the defensive. The distance widened 
from "managed news" to "credibility gap" to coverups that quickly became "uioperative." 
The Jeffersonian description of joumalists "forfeiting all title to belief' would now be 
more commonly ascribed to the officials that joumalists cover. Mendacity was so 
prevalent by the early 1970s that it inspired the quip that in two centuries the 
Americans had gone from George Washington, a President who could not tell a lie to 
Richard Nixon, a President who could not tell the truth. Later, satirist Mort Sahl 
added that President Reagan could not tell the difference. One of the most misleading 
assertions that Nixon was fond of making was how grossly unfair and hostile to him the 
press and especially the electronic media were. Theodore H. White did concede, in 
his narrative of the 1972 campaign, that the President's animus to the Washington Post, 
for example, was repaid in kind. Nevertheless, as novelist Philip Roth noted, that 
Nixon "should find this utterly conformist médium, these mammoth corporations like 
NBC and CBS, to be heretical and treasonous is a perfect measure of his powers of 
social observation" (White, Making 256; Roth 56). In each of Nixon's three 
Presidential campaigns, he was supported by about 80% of the American press; in 
1973, among newspapers which endorsed a Presidential candidate, 93% supported 
Nixon. The pro-Nixon newspapers enjoyed a circulation of over 30 million, while those 
backing George McGovem had a tenth of that figure (Schlesinger Jr., Imperial 230; 
White, Makmg 253-54). 
Before memories fade and the flags at half-mast are saluted too sentimentally, 
it is useful to recall how much of a Jeffersonian Nixon was, how far the independence 
of the press was breached. Kennedy had tried to get a messenger transferred when 
bad news was delivered and had also angrily cancelled the White House subscription 
totheNew YorkHerald-Tribune—ihoxi^ other factors eventually caused that newspaper 
to collapse. But newspapermen under Nixon had their telephones tapped and their 
notes and tapes almost subpoenaed by the Department of Justice. One CBS 
commentator, Daniel Schorr, was subjected to an FBI investigation; another, Marvin 
Kalb, to a disinformation campaign, accused of operating a—of all things—a Romanian 
agent. Nixon's appointees to the Supreme Court made possible the 5-4 decisión in 
Branzburg v. Hayes (1972) that confírmed the practice of jailing reporters who decline 
to reveal their confidential sources to grandjuries. As dissenting Justice Potter Stewart 
(an Eisenhower appointee) phrased it, joumalists were to be attached to the 
"investigative arm of govemment" (Schlesinger Jr., Imeperial 230-32; Kutler 175-83; 
Kalb 205-9). 
The danger posed by Vice President Spiro Agnew, when he denounced bias 
and monopoly in the mass media, was surely exaggerated. He had been very selective 
in his targets, which were picked for partisan rather than analytical reasons. But the 
First Amendment is supposed to protect Vice Presidents as well as "nattering nabobs 
of negativism," and it is hard to suppress the suspicion that any televisión station or 
commentator whom Spiro Agnew could intimidate was unlikely to hold ideas worth 
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considering anyway. What is indefensibie, though perfectly legal, was the move to 
silence the Washington Post when Nixon associates challenged the renewai of its 
licenses for two Florida televisión stations, an economic threat that caused the Post's 
stock to drop 28% in two weeks (Schlesinger Jr., Imperial 231). What is indefensibie, 
and most notorious of all in the relationship of President Nixon to the press, was the 
first attempt in American history to impose prior restraint upon newspapers, the very 
sort of governmental action which the First Amendment was intended to prevent. The 
Times decided to publish the Pentagon Papers in 1971 partly because it had been 
bumed before the Bay of Pigs invasión, and partly because in the intervening decade 
Reston in particular had leamed not to accept automatically an administration's 
definition of what is news or what is in the national interest (Ungar 99-100, 244, 246). 
The very excesses of the Nixon administration, in revealing the shallowness and 
sometimes the shoddiness of what was meant by national security and national 
interest—i. e., some representatives of the people might be embarrassed—had the effect 
of creating a wider and healthier distance between the press and the Presidency. The 
national interest is indeed best served by a skeptical and autonomous press, by access 
to bad news as well as the gospel. As the Founders recognized in devising obstacles 
to tyranny, citizens need to sift through the official lies, the misleading announcements, 
the half-truths. 
Nothing in these observations is intended to imply that the press itself has 
been a reliable protector of republican liberties, or that in any dispute government 
officials have inevitably been in the wrong. Few Americans who have enjoyed first-
hand knowledge of an event, and who have compared their own observations with 
coverage in the press, are astonished any more at the extent to which everyone from 
reporters to editors to printers manage to get things bungled. Nineteenth century 
Presidents hired prívate secretaries, twentieth century Presidents have press secretarios, 
while newspeople have often been reluctant to go beyond the official handout and the 
press reléase, and have been dependent on the cultivation of official sources. Too 
often watchdogs are petted so gently that they become lapdogs. For example, an ex-
chief of the Whíte House Correspondents Association, "Jack" Homer of the 
Washington Star, eamed such notoriety among his coUeagues for a wfllingness to pose 
queries that Presidential aides had planted that, when Eisenhower began one reply as 
follows, "Mr. Homer, I'm glad you asked that question," the room burst into laughter 
(Gi'ossman and Kumar 67). 
It ís also risky and lamentable that newspaper competition is insufficient or 
even absent in many towns and cities and even one state. Many citizens of New 
Hampshire must have found tiresome the Manchester Union Leader and the late 
publisher Wflliam Loeb's flair for coining phrases in his newspaper like "Kissinger the 
Kike?" and "Moscow Muskie" (Cash xviü). They nevertheless have had no other major 
daüy in their state—which hosts the first of the Presidential primaries—to read. Given 
the prestige which investigative joumalists have sometimes enjoyed, draped in the 
mantle of uncovering coverups from My Lai to Watergate and beyond, a wet blanket 
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should also be thrown in: reporters have been fallible, and many of them have tended 
to sensationalize, to degrade, to trivialize. (Once the U. S. Post Office found itself 
with an envelope on which "Tlie S. O. B." was written, without a street address or even 
a town. The mail was delivered to the Washington home of Drew Pearson, and had 
indeed been intended for the dyspeptic columnist [Pilat 44].) Reporters whose beat 
is the executive branch generally depend upon leaks from officials who are playing 
their own game within the bureaucracy, to sandbag superiors or to short-circuit policies 
that they find repugnant. Yet since neither the motives ñor the identities of such 
bureaucrats are commonly indicated, readers and perhaps even journaiists theniselves 
may not know how they are being used (Moynihan 45). Despitc the saturation of 
stories associated with the Watergate scandal, for example, the identity of "Deep 
Throat"—he or she or they or possibly no one at all—is yet to be publicly disclosed. 
Ñor is the motive of Woodward's source in confirming the unravelling of the coverup 
known, perhaps not even to Woodward (Epstein 6-13, 16-17, 18, 30-31; "Woodward" 
17; Rosenbaum 20-22). 
The power of the press over politicians may be just as unexamined and 
insidious. It is not the voting machines or the computers that sometimes determine 
victory in Presidential primaries. For example, Lyndon Johnson in 1968 and Edmund 
Muskie in 1972 received the most votes in the Democratic primary in New Hampshire, 
yet because of other pols bearing polis, especially Eugene McCarthy and George 
McGovem, the press was more impressed by how well these challengers had performed 
against the front-runners and wrote its stories accordingly. The joumalistic 
interpretation of the New Hampshire results helped make McCarthy and McGovem 
look like the winners they weren't. In 1988 the candidacy of Gary Hart was discredited 
by the single question of a repórter, on the topic of adultery. That journalist, Paul 
Taylor of the Washington Post, iater explained why Hart and Senator Joseph Biden had 
been excised from the Democratic primaries: "Somebody had to prune the field. It 
simply wasn't practical for voters to make choices among a dozen or more contenders. 
. . . The assignment fell to the press—there was no one else." Monitors had elevated 
themselves, rather arrogantly, into the king-making roles that backroom bosses once 
played (Taylor 9, 10-11, 15-16). 
Moreover there are serious problems of rebuttal for almost everyone besides 
a President of the United States. Ordinary citizens cannot talk back to their TV sets 
ñor count on winning costly libel suits; the power of the press to misjudge and to 
attack is virtually unchecked by the law of libel, although the threat of such a suit can 
be devastating to weak or unpopular newspapers. The press is intended, in Jefferson's 
phrase, to be "a curb on our functionaries," and the press conference emerged in the 
twentieth century to constitute a kind of curb. "Nobody elected us to do this," veteran 
Washington correspondent Peter Lisagor once explained, "but since we don't have a 
parliamentary system in which the President can be questioned on the floor of 
Congress, the press acquired that role by custom and tradition. We can't make a 
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strong case for it though."' Yet no check exists upon the press itself except the refusal 
to buy newspapers and magazines or to buy time on radio and televisión. In other 
words the press is granted the privilege of regulating itself—except when the law is 
violated—the kind of privilege that the framers of the Constitution shrewdly avoided 
bestowing on the new govemment itself—and henee the intricate system of balance of 
powers, checks and balances, and ultimately of course the consent of the govemed. 
Though joumalists are expected, rather heroically, to regúlate themselves, they 
are not required to flash professional credentials. Without intemal checks or 
contrapuntal pressure, newspeople have often been vicious, incompetent, wrong and 
unfair to Presidents and other people. They have also been too kind, too indulgent. 
Heie isNewsweek's Morton Kondracke, often branded a "liberal," writing in 1985, after 
Ronald Reagan's cáncer operation: 
The President has cast a kind of goMen glow over the past 4 1/2 years, his 
programs representiiig a retum to bedrock American valúes and his optimism 
shielding the country from bitter realities such as burdensome debt, social 
inequity and intemational challenge. Reagan is a kind of magic tótem against 
the cold future (Fallows 45; Griffith 80; Weisman 34; Hertsgaard 253, 346). 
Interestingly enough, Reagan's reputation as the Great Communicator did not depend 
on mastery of press conferences, of which he held fewer than any of his predecessors 
in the previous half century. And although heightened controversy in recent years has 
undoubtedlyprovokedgreaterself-awarenessandintrospectionamongjounialists,these 
problems and others are no closer to solution than when Lippmann, Mencken and A. 
J. Liebling scrutinized their colleagues so mordantly in earlier decades. 
It is certainly possible, though few Americans may admit it, that there are 
questions without answers, problems without solutions. Here one of Lyndon Johnson's 
favoríte stories is pertinent. During an oral examination, a candidate for the position 
of railroad engineer in Texas was asked what he would do ¡f two trains were 
approaching one another on the same track at speeds of one hundred miles an hour 
and they were only fifty yards apart. The engineering candidate deliberated his answer 
and then replied that in those circumstances he would go fetch his brother. Why?, the 
candidate was asked. He replied: "He's never seen a train wreck before." 
The relationship between the press and the Presidency, while rarely definable 
as a colusión course, has nevertheless been a most imperfect, a bad system. But it 
could be worse, as can be gleaned from, say, the history of the former Soviet Union. 
Here is a statement from the Central Committee of the Communist Party on the 
3. Interview with Peter Lisagor, February 11, 1976, qtd. in Grossman and Kumar 5; 
Kutler 170-74. 
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sixtieth anniversary oí Pravda, a newspaper whose then editor had earlier served as 
ambassador to Prague and to Hanoi: 
The major tasks of the press are to popularize... advanced methods of labor, 
management and administration; to work persistently for their introduction 
everywhere, and to edúcate tirelessly in all Soviet people a conscientious, 
Creative attitude toward work, a feeling of being master of the counXry and a 
high sense of responsibility to society. . . . (Kaiser 215) 
Compared to that historie articulation of the responsibility of the press, the 
often nasty record in the United States of its relations with Presidents, a legacy of 
mistrust and misunderstanding, seems less somber and dispiriting. Instead, there is 
something rather touching about a remark that Harry Truman uttered five years after 
leaving the White House. His reminiscence partly validates the Founders' visión of 
popular sovereignty—though two centuries later—citizens can vigorously transniit their 
views with FAX, overaight polis, 800 numbers, FedEx, air shuttles, talk radio progranis 
and on-line buUetin boards. The White House e-mail address on America Online is 
"clinton pz." Truman's recoUection bears meditation as a clue to the partial success of 
the national experiment in self-government: "When I was Presidenl, I feh that I always 
leamed more about what was on the minds of the peopie froni the reporters' questions 
than they could possibly learn from me" (Blumenthal 44; Truman 25-31; Schlesinger 
Jr., Imperial 225). 
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